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 FLORENCE KELLEY AND THE BATTLE AGAINST LAISSEZ-FAIRE 
CONSTITUTIONALISM1  
Felice Batlan 
 We all know the story of the demise of substantive due process in the 
1930s and our story usually features heroes such as Louis Brandeis and Felix 
Frankfurter and the great male legal progressives of the day who rose up from 
academia, the bench, and the bar, to put an end to what historians label “legal 
orthodoxy.” In this essay, I seek to demonstrate that Florence Kelley was a 
crucially important legal progressive who was at the front lines of drafting and 
defending new legislation that courts were striking down as violating the 
Fourteenth Amendment and state constitutions. Looking at who was drafting and 
lobbying for path breaking progressive legislation and how such legislation was 
being defended accomplishes a number of things. It uncovers how male legal 
actors at times worked closely and collaborated with women reformers. 
Furthermore, thinking about women reformers as central legal actors demands 
that we examine our own categorical thinking. Placing progressive era women 
reformers in a non-porous women’s sphere, while imagining that elite male legal 
thinkers were sealed within an all-male world of academics, lawyers and jurists, 
distorts late nineteenth and early twentieth century legal culture and leads to what 
we might call “intellectual segregation.”2 This essay is thus a work of bricolage 
that brings together the scholarship on women’s leading roles in progressive era 
reform with mainstream narratives of legal history. 
 Situating Florence Kelley as a legal reformer further allows us to explore 
some of the significant differences between how men and women legal reformers 
approached the law. In part, male legal thinkers deeply struggled with questions 
involving legal rights, the common law, the role of judges, the redistribution of 
wealth, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the growth of an administrative state. 
Many women reformers did not have similar struggles and qualms. These women 
legal reformers had come to realize that custom, the common law, and courts had 
consistently thwarted women’s rights. Courts had failed to grant women the right 
to vote, found that the Fourteenth Amendment did not protect women from 
discrimination, and often negated the Married Women’s Property Acts. By the 
turn of the century, elite women reformers had few illusions about courts, the 
common law, the Constitution, and legal custom. Where men like Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr. posited that custom and the common law served as a buffer between 
                                                 
1 An earlier version of this essay, “Notes from the Margins: Florence Kelley and the 
Making of Sociological Jurisprudence” appears in ed. Daniel Hamilton and Alfred 
Brophy, Transformations in American Legal History: Law, Ideology, and Methods v. II 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 239- 253. This essay is a work in progress 
and part of a larger project on progressive era women reformers as significant legal 
actors. 
2 Thank you to Alfred Brophy for using the phrase “intellectual segregation.”  
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the state and the individual, many women legal reformers understood that custom 
and the common law blocked women’s struggles for rights and more generally 
for social reform.3  Having a stake in the system, many progressive male legal 
thinkers reached such critical assessments regarding courts, the Constitution, and 
the common law more slowly. In contrast, Florence Kelley radically reinterpreted 
the Constitution as placing affirmative duties on the state. These duties required 
the state to provide for those material conditions which would foster true 
democracy. This radical vision, which Kelley had already set forth by 1905, is 
exceedingly modern and it defined the ways in which she would defend 
legislation from Constitutional challenge and marry the philosophy of 
pragmatism, social science, on the ground reality, and law. 
 Kelley was born into an elite Pennsylvania family that had deep roots in 
various reform movements. Her father was a lawyer, judge, and long-time 
congressman, and her great-aunt was a Quaker abolitionist involved in women’s 
rights struggles. Like Elizabeth Cady Stanton, who learned law from her attorney 
father, Kelley was immersed in law and political change from a young age. At 
Cornell College in the late 1870s, Kelley founded the Social Science Club. While 
spending a year with her father in Washington D.C., Kelley wrote her senior 
thesis, entitled “On Some Changes in the Legal Status of the Child since 
Blackstone.” In the thesis, Kelley used traditional legal sources, statutes, and 
statistical data on children. From this very early period, Kelley was already 
attempting to combine law and empirical evidence.4 
 Having graduated from Cornell and unable to pursue an advanced degree 
in the United States because she was a woman, Kelley enrolled at Zurich 
University, where she spent three years studying government. During this period, 
she became immersed in socialism and was the first person to translate into 
English Friedrich Engels’s The Condition of the Working Class in England. She 
also began a long-term personal acquaintance with Engels. Upon her return to the 
United States, Kelley worked on legislation in New York and Philadelphia that 
sought to limit working hours for women and minors. By 1891, Kelley had 
already authored twenty-five articles, which had appeared in national and 
international publications primarily focusing on labor questions.5 Kelley certainly 
                                                 
3 See Morton Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960: The Crisis of 
Legal Orthodoxy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 140. 
4  Kathyrn Kish Sklar’s, Florence Kelley and the Nation’s Work: The Rise of Women’s 
Political Culture, 1830–1900 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995) is probably 
the definitive biography of Kelley up until 1899. My goal here is not to bring new 
bibliographical information to light but rather to emphasize Kelley’s legal work and how 
it fits in to the larger narrative of legal progressivism. In this essay, I draw heavily upon 
Sklar’s work. 
5  See Sklar; See also Louise Knight, Citizen: Jane Addams and the Struggle for 
Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 229. 
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understood herself as an intellectual, socialist, and reformer with a keen interest 
in using law to better the conditions of labor.  
 After the dissolution of her marriage, Kelley arrived at Jane Addams’s 
Hull House in Chicago, where Julia Lathrop, one of the few women members of 
the Illinois bar, was already a resident. Although Kelley envisioned becoming a 
university professor and hoped that Richard Ely would aid her in obtaining such 
a position at the University of Wisconsin, he was no help.6 Ely’s rebuff was not 
surprising, given that the doors of the academy (with the exception of women’s 
colleges) were essentially closed to women. Thus Kelley immersed herself in 
Hull House, seeking to combine her legal and theoretical knowledge with 
firsthand experience regarding workers’ lives. Describing her Hull House 
experience, Kelley wrote to Engels, “I am . . . learning more in a week of actual 
conditions of proletarian life in America than in any previous year.”7 
 In multiple ways, Hull House participated in creating the new practice of 
social science and marrying it with the emerging philosophy of pragmatism. At 
the center of Jane Addams and Hull House’s philosophy and methodology stood 
this rejection of certainty and the embrace of material, on-the-ground study, and 
action. As pragmatist philosopher George Mead remarked, “The settlement 
embodied the ideal of an engaged ‘social’ science guided by ‘working 
hypotheses’—provisional rather than absolute or dogmatic knowledge.”8 Addams 
called for settlement houses to be sites of experimentation that would continually 
adjust their methods and goals as conditions required.9 One of the important 
contributions of settlement houses was their often path breaking social science 
research. As Addams wrote, “We were the actual pioneers in field research.”10 
Josephine Goldmark further remarked that “The settlements antedated by ten 
years the establishment of the first foundation for social research.”11  
 Addams and Hull House also participated in the development and lived 
experience of pragmatism. John Dewey was extraordinarily close to Addams and 
deeply involved in Hull House. He also readily acknowledged the settlement’s 
influence on his thoughts and actions.12 Furthermore Hull House was a center of 
intellectual life through which the leading intellectuals and reformers of the day 
passed, including Ernst Freund and Roscoe Pound. When Pound was teaching in 
                                                 
6 Sklar, Florence Kelley, 206. 
7 Knight, Citizen, 232.  
8 Andrew Feffer, The Chicago Pragmatists and American Progressivism (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1993), 114.  
9 Knight, Citizen, 257.  
10 Goldmark, Impatient Crusader, 31, quoting Jane Addams, The Second Twenty Years at 
Hull-House (New York: Macmillan, 1930), 405. 
11 Goldmark, Impatient Crusader, 31.  
12 Knight, Citizen, 240, 258, 325–26. 
 4
Chicago (1907–10), the very period during which he called for a sociological 
jurisprudence, his former student Edith Abbott, then a resident at Hull House, 
introduced Pound to Jane Addams and Hull House. It is here that Pound became 
interested in social work.13 
  Kelley was immersed in this environment. It provided an exceptional 
space from which she could develop and combine her interest in law, political 
economy, and fieldwork. With Addams’s help, Kelley obtained a position with 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics of Illinois, where she primarily concentrated on 
women’s factory work and an anti-sweating campaign. This work lead Caroll 
Wright, head of the U.S. Census Bureau, to hire Kelley to lead the Chicago 
portion of a federal study on urban slums. Kelley thus began the process of 
canvassing Chicago’s neighborhoods, eliciting responses to questions that in part 
surveyed respondents for nationality, conditions of labor, wages, and health. 
Where Wright used such information to produce The Slums of Baltimore, 
Chicago, New York and Philadelphia, Kelley and other Hull House residents 
created the groundbreaking Hull House maps. As Kelley’s biographer writes, 
“By defining spatial relationships among human groups, they vividly depicted 
social and economic relationships.”14 Urban space, ethnicity, race, health,  
housing, and their relationship to poverty were denaturalized and contextualized. 
During this part of Kelley’s career, she was functioning as a social scientist, 
collecting and analyzing facts, while showing their relationship to poverty and 
the conditions of labor. The maps, along with essays by Kelley, Addams, and 
other settlement house residents, would appear in Richard Ely’s series Library of 
Economics and Politics.  
 Other work that Kelley accomplished consisted of examining the 
working conditions of 5,099 women. Data collected from such women and 
employers included pay, length of working days, periods of unemployment, 
nationality, information on home life, expense budgets, and family background. 
This study dramatically demonstrated that working women often supported 
themselves and their families and sought to vividly show the necessity of women 
receiving living wages.15 Kelley subsequently conducted a study on the 
conditions of sweatshops in which women worked. Her 1892 report found that 
women worked from ten hours to sixteen hours a day at extremely low wages and 
often in horrendous conditions. The report recommended groundbreaking 
legislation that would require the licensing of manufacturers, the prohibition of 
garment manufacturing in tenements, the regulation of child labor, maximum-
hours laws, and regular inspections. Kelley, along with others, then drafted a 
legislative bill that provided for maximum hours for women workers and a ban 
                                                 
13 N. E. H. Hull, Roscoe Pound and Karl Llewellyn: Searching for an American 
Jurisprudence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 72. 
14 Sklar, Florence Kelley, 229. 
15 Ibid., 232. 
 5
on child labor. It also proposed the creation of an office of Illinois factory 
inspector.  
 Kelley understood well that such labor legislation was redistributive as 
well as groundbreaking. Her focus on women and children was a strategic and 
realistic appraisal of what the public and legal precedent would support. As 
Kelley reasoned, the public was much more likely to support legislation 
involving women and children, whom the public understood as helpless, than 
men, whom the public construed as being able to care for themselves. 
Furthermore, she was keenly aware that the common law traditionally construed 
women’s contracts rights narrowly, as evidenced by coverture. Finally, Kelley 
firmly believed that the reduction of women’s hours would have the material 
effect of reducing men’s hours as well. Importantly, from this early date, Kelley 
tied together law on the books with law in action. As she wrote, “Mere 
enactments are idle in the face of a menace like this. The delinquent must be 
confronted not only with the law on the statute book but the law-officer at his 
door.”16 She and other legal progressives would spend the next forty years 
fighting for and defending protective workers legislation. Kelley’s work in 1892 
essentially set forth the manner in which she would operate for close to forty 
years—investigate, draft laws, lobby for such laws, and work on developing a 
regulatory state that would enforce such laws. It is difficult not to see that Kelley 
provided much of the groundwork for what Pound would much later call 
sociological jurisprudence.   
 Kelley’s successful work, along with the influence of Addams, led the 
Illinois governor to appoint Kelley to the newly created post of Illinois factory 
inspector. At approximately this time, Kelley enrolled in and quickly graduated 
from Northwestern Law School. As chief factory inspector, Kelley had the 
principal responsibility for enforcement of the law that she had drafted. Kelley’s 
office quickly began prosecuting manufacturers, and at one point Kelley boasted 
that her office was averaging one indictment per day.17 Thus by 1893, Kelley was 
fully functioning as an attorney at the forefront of interpreting, enforcing, and 
expanding new state regulatory powers. Simultaneously, Kelley and her staff 
engaged in significant investigation, collecting and interpreting empirical 
evidence on the conditions of labor, including child labor, workplace injuries, 
and the importance of the eight-hour work day. Kelley’s methodology continued 
to combine what was now even more detailed statistical work with law. For 
example, Kelley wrote, “It is my ambition to make the most thoroughly 
specialized study of statistics of child labor that has ever been made.”18 Such 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 233, quoting Kelley’s report for the Bureau of Labor Statistics of Illinois, 
“Working Women in Chicago,” in Seventh Biennial Report (1892), 402. 
17 Sklar, Florence Kelley, 248. 
18 Ibid., 279, quoting a letter from Kelley to another woman reformer. 
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information was then used to both educate the public and create an agenda for 
future legislation.  
 In 1894, Kelley warned manufacturers that her office would begin 
prosecuting employers who employed women for over eight hours a day. As she 
began such prosecutions, she confronted the newly formed Illinois 
Manufacturing Protective Association, which was created to challenge the 
constitutionality of the Illinois maximum-hours law for women. A prosecution of 
nine manufacturers brought by Kelley’s office resulted in the courts confronting 
the constitutional issue of whether the law violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Kelley, along with two others, wrote the state’s brief. The brief is quite 
remarkable for its compendium on the multiple ways in which the state already 
regulated industry and individuals pursuant to the police power. Indeed it seemed 
to be saying that state action was everywhere. The brief further claimed that 
“Labor in factories of more than eight hours a day deprives the average woman . . 
. of their health . . . so that in the end they are deprived of labor by a long day; 
and obtain more labor, and the results of labor, by a short day.”19 Pursuant to this 
argument, worthy of the best legal realist, only state action could produce actual 
freedom of contract.  
  The brief also cited a wide variety of experts regarding the health effects 
of long hours on women. For example, it quoted the Massachusetts Bureau of 
Labor, the U.S. Commissioners of Labor, a report to the British Board of Local 
Government, and a report to the Royal Commission on Labour of England. As 
the brief argued, such authorities agreed that workers’ nerves and health were 
damaged “by the constant tension of factory work, the machine-like method of 
toil, and the accompanying tremendous strain on the female system.”20 This, of 
course, would become one of the main arguments used fourteen years later in the 
Muller brief. Even more importantly, the Ritchie brief was already experimenting 
with the use of medical and sociological data.   
 As we are well aware, in Ritchie v. Illinois (1895), the Illinois Supreme 
Court unanimously struck down the eight-hour law for women as a violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision did not, however, strike down the 
prohibition against child labor. Kelley criticized the court as follows:  
The judicial mind has not kept pace with the strides of industrial 
development in Illinois, and in this decision the Supreme Court shows 
that Illinois is in law to-day what it was in fact when the Constitution 
was adopted in 1870—an agricultural State. . . . It may be that the 
Court is as advanced as that part of the community which is not yet 
thoroughly aware that Illinois is now one of the great manufacturing 
States. When the observation of a few more years has convinced the 
                                                 
19 Ritchie v. Illinois, Brief and Argument of the Defendant in Error, Illinois Supreme 
Court (1894), 46. 
20 Ibid, 15. 
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medical profession, the philanthropists, and the educators as experience 
has already convinced factory employees themselves, that it is a life 
and death matter . . . to have a working day of reasonable length 
guaranteed by law, it will be found possible to rescue the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States from the perverted 
application upon which this decision rests.21  
The judgment that courts were significantly out of touch with reality would 
become one of the constant complaints made by legal progressives following 
Lochner, ten years later. Here Kelley not only fully articulated the problem of 
courts adherence to abstract principles that did not conform to on-the-ground 
facts but also understood that it was the duty of experts from a wide variety of 
disciplines to educate courts. 
 In 1899, Kelley accepted a position as head of the newly created 
National Consumers League (NCL) in New York. Through her work with the  
NCL, she came into close contact with a slew of male legal reformers, 
economists, and progressives, including John Graham Brooks, Richard Ely, 
E. R. A. Seligman, Louis Brandeis, Felix Frankfurter, and Benjamin Cohen, just 
to name a few. Although in its early years the NCL concentrated on influencing 
the purchasing habits of consumers, Kelley soon expanded its work to focus 
primarily on legal reform, lobbying, and defending protective legislation for 
workers against constitutional challenges. Kelley and her female employees, 
including Josephine Goldmark, drafted model bills regarding maximum hours, 
prohibitions on night work for women, and child labor laws.  Kelley played a 
leading role in selecting the cases in which the NCL would become involved and 
negotiated with states to allow the NCL to intervene in court proceedings. She 
also “planned and oversaw the development of the legal briefs drafted by her 
female assistants at the NCL and recruited prominent male attorneys to serve as 
legal figureheads in these cases.”22  
 While at the NCL, Kelley published her first full-length book, 
Some Ethical Gains through Legislation (1905). In it, she argued that the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not prohibit protective legislation for workers. 
Instead of freedom of contract, Kelley framed the work around a 
constellation of rights including the right to childhood, the right to leisure, 
and the rights of purchasers. In contrast to the laissez-faire state, Kelley 
advocated an activist state that pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment had 
affirmative duties to its citizens. For Kelley, rights arose from the needs of 
                                                 
21 Third Annual Report of the Factory Inspectors of Illinois for the Year Ending 
December 15 1895  (1896), 7. 
22 Susan D. Carle, “Gender in the Construction of the Lawyer’s Persona: Florence Kelley 
and the Nation’s Work,” Harvard Women’s Law Journal 22 (1999): 258. Carle offers an 
excellent discussion of Kelley and her professional identity, although we ultimately draw 
different conclusions.  
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a democratic society, and it was the state’s obligation to foster the health 
and well-being of its citizens. Thus a right to childhood existed so that 
children could attend school and become productive citizens. Such a right 
required the state to prohibit child labor and institute compulsory 
education. A right to leisure allowed workers to rest and “undo the 
damage wrought in the working-hours, so that the worker could remain fit 
for citizenship in the Republic.”23 Furthermore, leisure promoted the 
preservation of health, which was necessary for the overall well-being of 
society. As Kelley wrote, “To be deprived of leisure is to be deprived of 
those things worth living.”24 Individual rights, for Kelley, were tied to 
what she called social rights—those rights of the entire society—for 
society could not flourish if individuals did not flourish. One way in which 
Kelley demonstrated the interconnectedness of individuals and the larger 
society was by uniting production and consumption. Without the worker 
having a right to leisure, health, and decent working conditions, the 
consumer never could be sure of the origin or cleanliness of commodities 
that she purchased. The ill worker, exhausted and sick from overwork in 
unsanitary conditions, would spread germs to the consumer in the goods 
that she made. As Kelley wrote, “Before the individual purchaser can 
vindicate his own personal rights, the whole body of purchasers are 
constrained to save childhood for the children, and home life for the 
workers.”25  
 In Ethical Gains, Kelley surveyed and discussed relevant court cases 
regarding the regulation of work and she weaved an argument for the 
constitutionality of such laws under the police power. As she articulated, liberty 
of contract meant nothing to the worker who did not have bargaining power. 
Engaging in a realist-type argument, Kelley posited that liberty of contract was 
itself an unconstitutional form of class legislation, as it increased the power of 
manufacturers and correspondingly harmed workers.  She also engaged in a 
critique of actual power recognizing that those industries that restricted hours of 
labor generally involved male skilled workers who were voters. Often through 
unions, they were able to negotiate with employers for limited hours. In contrast, 
the weakest in society, those who had the least political and economic bargaining 
power, such as children, poor women, and unskilled workers, were most 
exploited and in need of state protection – only with state intervention could 
liberty of contract have substantive meaning. Thus in Ethical Gains, Kelley 
                                                 
23 Florence Kelley, Some Ethical Gains through Legislation (New York: Macmillan, 
1905), 142–43. 
24 Ibid., 111. 
25 Ibid., 230. 
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makes a highly sophisticated argument through the interrogation of rights, power, 
contract and the needs of a democratic society.  
 Repeatedly Kelley took some hope in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision 
in Holden v. Hardy (1898), which upheld a law regulating the hours of miners in 
Utah. If such a dangerous occupation could be regulated, Kelley reasoned, then it 
was just a matter of demonstrating that essentially all unregulated manual work 
had serious health implications for the worker and the public. Thus the regulation 
of hours of work could almost always be construed as a matter of health, fitting 
squarely within the police power. As she argued, workers in factories were 
subject to increased mechanization, which often required significantly greater 
speed, taxing eyes and the physical and mental well-being of the worker. 
Tenement house workers suffered from extreme fatigue, which resulted in 
multiple diseases such as tuberculosis. She also ingeniously interpreted court 
precedent as requiring broader rather than narrower regulation. For example, she 
agreed with the New York Court of Appeals’ in re Jacobs (1885) decision, which 
struck down a law prohibiting the making of cigars in tenement houses as class 
legislation. Kelley explained that the law was class legislation, as it only 
prohibited cigar making rather than all tenement house work. Thus the problem 
with the law was that it was too narrow and the solution was legislation 
prohibiting all tenement house work as a matter of public health. Furthermore, on 
empirical grounds, Kelley asserted that the decision was outdated, as a great deal 
more evidence existed regarding the health effects of tenement house work on 
society as a whole. As she wrote, the “health of the worker is an important part of 
the health of the public.”26 It was now just a matter of courts taking notice of 
facts. 
  Again, setting the groundwork for later legal progressives, Kelley 
emphasized that the question was “How can the courts be enlightened and 
instructed concerning conditions as they exist? This is the burning question 
which confronts both the purchasers and wage earners.”27 Part of the solution was 
for courts to defer to legislatures. As she wrote, it was legislatures that had the 
“apparatus for investigating the conditions of industry.”28 Thus Kelley essentially 
called for a fact-based jurisprudence. Demonstrating Kelley’s understanding of 
the importance of law and the courts, the appendix to Ethical Considerations is 
comprised of the most important court decisions regarding worker legislation. 
Where many male legal progressives primarily wrote for an audience of lawyers, 
Kelley wrote for a wider audience of concerned citizens, whom she hoped to 
educate and inform regarding the actions and failures of courts.  
                                                 
26 Ibid., 233. 
27 Ibid., 254. 
28 Ibid., 254. 
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 In 1906, a New York appellate court ruled that a statute prohibiting 
women’s night work was unconstitutional.29 In part, Kelley blamed the result on 
the poor lawyering of attorneys in the New York attorney general’s office. In one 
memorandum, Kelley railed that despite her efforts to make the case a priority, 
the attorney for the state had not even attended the oral argument. She continued 
that the brief was a “disgraceful exhibition of ignorance of the law on the 
subject.”30 This memorandum is a clear reminder that Kelley was an attorney 
deeply involved in legal strategy. Even more importantly, Kelley vowed that the 
NCL would partake in the legal defense of challenged labor statutes and that a 
prime goal of its involvement would be to force the courts to recognize the 
realities of industrial work.31 As Josephine Goldmark remembered, the loss in 
Williams on the ground that there was no relationship between night work and 
women’s health and welfare made it clear that “The question was no longer 
abstract and legal, but rather in a deep sense social and medical. It followed that 
the purely legal defense of these laws was falling wide of the mark. . . . The men 
upon the bench needed for their guidance the empirical testimony of the working 
woman’s physician, the factory inspector, and the economist. They needed, in a 
word, to know the facts.”32 Kelley and Goldmark waited for the next case.  
  One of the few places where it is widely acknowledged that the world of 
women reformers interacted with the world of male legal progressives is the 
Muller brief (1908) written by Josephine Goldmark and Louis Brandeis. It was 
Kelley, with the input of Goldmark, who decided to involve Louis Brandeis. 
Brandeis and Kelley in fact occupied overlapping worlds. For example, the 
Brandeis’were neighbors of and close to Glendower Evans, a Boston women’s 
reformer and one of Kelley’s dearest friends. Furthermore, Josephine and Pauline 
Goldmark kept Brandeis abreast of the work of the National Consumers League. 
 Yet the Muller brief, often lauded as the first work of sociological 
jurisprudence, needs to be more fully contextualized. Brandeis, as reported by 
Josephine Goldmark, requested a brief filled with facts, and Goldmark, under the 
supervision of Kelley, produced a prodigious amount of research on women 
workers and health. Yet there is good reason to believe that Goldmark wrote the 
entire brief with very little input from Brandeis.33 Furthermore, the idea of 
                                                 
29 People v. Williams, 101 NYS 562 (1906). 
30 Clement E. Vose, “The National Consumers’ League and the Brandeis Brief,” Midwest 
Journal of Political Science 1 (1957):  283 (quoting memorandum by Florence Kelley, 
Nov. ? 1906, NCL Papers). 
31 Josephine Goldmark, Fatigue and Efficiency: A Study in Industry (New York: Charities 
Publication Committee, 1912), 244. 
32 Ibid., 250. 
33 Carle, “Gender,” 258. For a wonderfully insightful work on Muller and its historical 
context see Nancy Wolloch, Muller v. Oregon: A Brief History with Documents (Boston: 
Bedford Books, 1996). 
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combining law and facts was clearly not new to Kelley, who had spent her life 
immersed in collecting facts and using such facts to support new laws. 
Importantly, the earlier brief in Ritchie (1894) had already incorporated 
sociological data regarding women workers’ health and is a clear precursor to 
and model for the Muller brief. This is a crucial fact that has been too often 
overlooked. Moreover, in Ethical Considerations (1905), Kelley had already 
recognized that the key element to convincing courts to sustain workers’ 
protective legislation was to educate judges with facts—a position that she had 
already articulated in her 1895 criticism of Ritchie.  
 In 1910, Goldmark and Brandeis once again put together a fact-filled 
brief, this time for the Illinois Supreme Court in Ritchie v. Wayman.34 To 
Kelley’s great relief, the court upheld the law. With its victories in Muller and 
Ritchie, the NCL widely distributed its briefs to college professors, lawyers, 
economists, and others. State’s attorneys in Virginia, Michigan, and Louisiana 
used the briefs as models in their own attempts to uphold workers’ legislation.35 
In connection with the NCL’s brief in Bunting v. Oregon (1917), it raised $5,000 
specifically so that four thousand copies could be distributed. Josephine 
Goldmark wrote that the goal of such wide distribution was to reach those in law 
schools and economic departments.36  
  The NCL also received a grant from the Russell Sage Foundation to 
begin an intense study of workers, fatigue, and protective legislation that resulted 
in Goldmark’s tome-like Fatigue and Efficiency (1912). The first part of the book 
details the nature of and physiological effects of fatigue, the multiple harms that 
occur from overwork, and the results from numerous studies of industrial 
workers’ fatigue in specific industries. It is full of statistics, charts, and opinions 
from experts. It then documents the long history of worker legislation in other 
countries and more recent attempts to create labor laws in the United States. The 
second part of the book is comprised of material contained in the four briefs that 
Goldmark and Brandeis had submitted to various courts. In discussing how 
courts used freedom of contract to strike down workers’ protective legislation, 
Goldmark writes, “[S]ince employees do not stand upon an equality in bargaining 
power with their employers, the so-called ‘right’ to contract for a day of any 
length is purely theoretical. The worker in fact obeys the compulsion of 
circumstances. . . . They have, in fact, no choice or freedom in the matter. The 
alternative is to work or starve. To refuse means to be dismissed. Modern 
industry has reduced ‘freedom of contract’ to a paper privilege, a mere figure of 
rhetoric.”37 This absolute refutation of the meaning of freedom of contract by 
                                                                                                                         
 
34 244 Ill. 509 (1910). 
35 Vose, “National Consumers’ League,” 287. 
36 Ibid., 288. 
37 Goldmark, Fatigue and Efficiency, 244. 
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placing it into the context of the reality of workers’ lives represents the epitome 
of progressive legal thought. Moreover, Goldmark wrote Fatigue in order to 
provide readily usable material for lawyers and activists advocating and 
defending protective labor laws. Thus the NCL, under Kelley’s leadership, must 
be recognized as one of the most active, central, and consistent sites of legal 
progressivism and the fight over the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
NCL’s remarkable activism continued without rupture well into the 1920s. 
 In the early 1920s, Molly Dewson succeeded Goldmark in preparing the 
social and economic data that would go into NCL briefs. Dewson is an excellent 
example of the second generation of women social scientists who were mentored, 
in part, by Kelley. At the NCL, Dewson worked closely with Felix Frankfurter 
and it was she who compiled the massive facts that went into the Adkins brief 
while Frankfurter worked on the legal sections. While the Muller brief was 
approximately 108 pages, the Adkins brief was over 1,100 pages long. The NCL 
had perfected the art of the sociological brief, always believing that given enough 
facts, courts would understand that workers’ protective legislation fell within the 
police power. The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Adkins was a devastating 
blow for Kelley and instituted a serious split within the NCL, which had 
participated in at least fifteen court cases regarding the constitutionality of 
workers legislation since 1908. Kelley, reasonably frustrated with courts, began 
advocating a constitutional amendment that would protect such legislation. 
Frankfurter, Roscoe Pound, and other male lawyers opposed any such 
amendment as too radical. Instead Frankfurter and his allies argued that the NCL 
should continue to draft legislation around court decisions. When Kelley would 
not accept such advice, the Frankfurter contingent refused to further participate in 
her efforts.38 In part, this split within the NCL may hearken back to the difference 
between those male legal progressives and realists who were so steeped in law 
that they could not abandon the common law and traditional Constitutional 
arguments, and the many women legal reformers who, from their own 
experience, viewed courts, the common law, and even the Constitution as 
significant obstacles to reform.39 
 Recognizing and incorporating women as legal reformers allows us to 
reexamine, reinterpret, and expand traditional narratives of legal history. For 
example, the sociological jurisprudence that Roscoe Pound called for was well 
underway in the work that women reformers and others were doing. By the late 
1890s, Kelley had developed a methodology that united law and facts. We can 
see this in her numerous efforts to draft and lobby for new laws that drastically 
expanded state power, and the ways in which she connected such laws to on-the-
                                                 
38 Carle, “Gender,” 259–61. 
39 For a similar story of growing frustration with courts and the common law, see John 
Fabian Witt, “Crystal Eastman and the Internationalist Beginnings of American Civil 
Liberties,” Duke Law Review 54 (2004): 705–63. 
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ground facts. From the mid-1890s on, she identified “liberty of contract” as an 
empty phrase for workers without bargaining power, and she sought to 
restructure a system of rights based upon the needs of a democratic industrial 
society. She further recognized that the key to legal reform was presenting facts 
of industrial life to judges. In part, we might understand the work of Brandeis, 
Pound, and Frankfurter as bringing to the more conservative bar and legal 
academy the legal progressivism that already existed within more radical circles 
of legal reform, in which women comprised a significant component. N. E. H. 
Hull writes of Pound, “As committed as he was to reform, it was a muted 
commitment, muted by his legalism, by his native caution, and by his ambition 
for a prize beyond the Midwest.”40 Women legal progressives such as Kelley, 
who stood outside legal academia and who devoted their lives to legal reform, 
functioned without such constraints, for they were already outsiders.  
 To acknowledge that some women must be recognized as crucial legal 
actors who were at the very center of  Constitutional litigation and the creation of 
new understandings of the meaning of substantive due process, challenges us to 
ask ourselves whom we imagine to be our historical actors and whom we are 
excluding. To dismiss Kelley as a groundbreaking legal thinker and litigator 
because she spent more time advocating for legal change and participating in the 
everyday work of drafting, defending, and enforcing laws rather than writing for 
an academic audience hampers our full understanding of legal history and the 
fight against laissez faire understandings of the Constitution. As Judge Charles F. 
Amidon, a federal district court judge, wrote to Kelley, “The conversations we 
had together in my home while you were here have been one of the liberalizing 
forces in my life. . . . During the last twelve or fifteen years of my active work on 
the bench I never decided a lawsuit without immersing myself at first hand with 
the life out of which it arose. You were one of the persons who got that lesson 
home in my life.”41 As Frankfurter wrote of Kelley, she played, “a powerful . . . 
role in securing legislation for the removal of the most glaring abuses of 
our hectic industrialization following the Civil War. But we owe her an 
even deeper and more enduring debt for the continuing process she so 
largely helped to initiate, by which social legislation is promoted and 
eventually gets on the statute books.” From Frankfurter’s words, we can 
see that he recognized Kelley’s decisive role in the battle against laissez-
faire. Yet this recognition has dropped out of much mainstream legal 
history. Part of the future agenda for legal historians might entail writing a 
narrative that would allow us to see how the work of male legal 
progressives and women reformers was a joint enterprise. In doing so, the 
                                                 
40 Hull, Pound and Llewellyn, 75. 
41 Goldmark, Impatient Crusader, 176. 
 14
separate spheres of women’s activism and male legal reform may begin to 
look not so separate.  
